

Comparing Mobile Privacy Protection through Cross-Platform Applications

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Abstract—With the rapid growth of the mobile market, security of mobile platforms is receiving increasing attention from both research community as well as the public. In this paper, we make the first attempt to establish a baseline for security comparison between the two most popular mobile platforms. We investigate applications that run on both Android and iOS and examine the difference in the usage of their security sensitive APIs (SS-APIs). Our analysis over 2,600 applications shows that iOS applications consistently access more SS-APIs than their counterparts on Android. The additional privileges gained on iOS are often associated with accessing private resources such as device ID, camera, and users’ contacts.

A possible explanation for this difference in SS-API usage is that privileges obtained by an application on the current iOS platform are invisible to end users. Our analysis shows that: 1) third-party libraries (specifically advertising and analytic libraries) on iOS invoke more SS-APIs than those on Android; 2) Android application developers avoid requesting unnecessary privileges which will be shown in the permission list during application installation. Considering the fact that an Android application may gain additional privileges with privilege-escalation attacks and iOS provides a more restricted privilege set accessible by third-party applications, our results do not necessarily imply that Android provides better privacy protection than iOS. However, our evidence suggests that Apple’s application vetting process may not be as effective as Android’s privilege notification mechanism, particularly in protecting sensitive resources from third-party applications.

I. INTRODUCTION

The current intensive competition among mobile platforms has sparked a heated debate on which platform has a better architecture for security and privacy protection. Discussions usually focus on Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS, which are the top two players in terms of user base [1], [2]. Some claim that Android is better since it makes the complete permission list visible to users and it takes an open-source approach [2]. Some argue that iOS is better because 1) Apple screens all applications before releasing them to the iTunes App Store (aka. Apple’s vetting process); 2) Apple has complete control of its hardware so that OS patches and security fixes are more smoothly applied on all devices; and 3) the open-source nature of Android makes it an easier target of attacks than iOS [1]. Others [3], [4] suggest that the two platforms achieve comparable security but in different ways. These different voices clearly raise the need for establishing a *baseline* for security comparison among different mobile platforms. Unlike most prior efforts

in comparing the abstract and general practices towards security [1], [2], [3], [4], we make the first attempt to establish such a baseline by analyzing the security-sensitive API usage on cross-platform applications.

A *cross-platform application* is an application that runs on multiple mobile platforms, e.g., the Facebook application has both an Android and an iOS version with almost identical functionality. We first try to identify these cross-platform applications by crawling information on both Google Play and iTunes App Store. Our web crawler collects information of more than 300,000 Android applications and 400,000 iOS applications. Several data mining techniques are adopted to match the applications released for the two platforms. We find that 12.2% of the applications on Google Play have a replica on iTunes Store. Among them, we select the most popular 1,300 pairs to further analyze their security-sensitive API usage.

A security-sensitive API (SS-API) is a public API provided for third-party applications that may have access to private user data or control over certain device components (e.g., Bluetooth and camera). In order to analyze the similarities and differences of the SS-API usage, the first challenge is to develop an SS-API mapping between Android and iOS. Based on the permission concept on Android and the existing Android API-to-permission mapping provided by Felt et al. [5], we group the SS-APIs on iOS into 20 different API types and map them to the corresponding Android SS-APIs. Our analysis produces a list of SS-API types that are both supported by Android and iOS. With such API mappings available, we statically analyze the cross-platform applications (Android Dalvik binaries and iOS Objective-C executables).

By analyzing the 1,300 pairs of cross-platform applications, which are sampled from the most popular applications, we show that 73% of them on iOS access additional SS-APIs, compared to their replicas on Android. The additional SS-APIs invoked are mostly for accessing sensitive resources such as device ID, camera, user contacts, and calendar, which may cause privacy breaches or security risks without being noticed. We further investigate the underlying reasons by separately analyzing third-party libraries and applications’ own code. Our results show that the commonly used third-party libraries on iOS, especially the advertising and analytic libraries access more SS-APIs compared to

the corresponding libraries on Android. Similar results are observed from the applications’ own code. Further analysis shows that a likely explanation of such differences is that sensitive resources can be accessed more stealthily on the current iOS platform, compared to Android where all the privileges required by an application have to be shown to the end user during installation. We also discover, and confirm with the Android application developers, that SS-APIs may be intentionally avoided if the same functionality can be implemented by non-security sensitive APIs. These results suggest that Apple’s vetting process may not be as effective as that most users think, particularly in protecting users’ private data from third-party applications. This problem might also have been realized by Apple Inc., as the newly released iOS 6 has added privilege notifications for accessing user contacts, calendar, photos, and reminders.

The contributions of this paper are as follows:

- We establish the first baseline for comparing the security architectures of different mobile platforms by examining security-sensitive API usage of cross-platform applications. This baseline provides a more comprehensive understanding on how the platform difference influences the privacy protection against third-party applications.
- We investigate the SS-APIs of iOS platform and their relations to Android SS-APIs, which complement the existing knowledge on the security architecture of contemporary mobile platforms. Our analysis reveals the SS-API types that are supported by both Android and iOS.
- We implement static analysis tools for both Android and iOS applications and apply these tools on popular cross-platform applications. Our results show significant difference in the SS-API usage for Android and iOS third-party applications. The detailed analysis shows a strong correlation between such usage difference and the lack of an explicit privilege-list mechanism on iOS, which may imply that Apple’s vetting process is not as effective as expected in restricting SS-API usage by application developers.

II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

A. Security Model: Android vs. iOS

Mobile security is very different from desktop PC security – the security goal of mobile operating systems is to make the platforms inherently secure rather than to force users to rely upon third-party security solutions. Thus, various security mechanisms are adopted and enabled as default on current mobile operating systems. The security features used by Android and iOS are listed in Table I.

Privilege Notification: On Android, an application has to explicitly declare the privileges it requires. A user will be presented with these privileges when installing an application so that he can choose not to proceed if he is unwilling

Table I
SECURITY MODEL COMPARISON: ANDROID VS. IOS

Security Feature	Android	iOS
Privilege Notification	Yes	Partial
Approval/Vetting Process	Partial	Yes
Digital Signing	Yes	Yes
Binary Encryption	Since v4.1	Yes
Sandboxing	Yes	Yes
Data Encryption	Yes	Yes
Damage Control	Yes	Yes
Address Space Layout Randomization	Since v4.0	Since v4.3

to grant the corresponding privileges. On iOS, however, all third-party applications are treated “equally” in the sense that they are given the same set of privileges as default. Until iOS 5, the only privileges which require users’ explicit acknowledgement are for accessing location information and for sending push notifications.

Approval/Vetting Process: Approval from Apple is needed before an application is distributed via the iTunes Store. Apple screens each uploaded application to check whether it contains malicious code or violates Apple’s privacy policy before releasing it on the iTunes Store. This vetting process is not well-documented, and there have been cases where malicious applications passed the vetting process but had to be removed later from the iTunes Store [6]. On the Android platform, Bouncer [7] is recently revealed by Android team which provides automated scanning of Google Play for potentially malicious software. However, Bouncer does not require developers to go through an application approval process. It performs a set of analysis on the applications that are already released on Google Play.

Signing and Encryption: On both platforms, every application is digitally signed with a certificate. The difference is that Android applications are signed by developers and iOS applications are signed by Apple. Furthermore, signing on Android is mainly used in the sandbox for resource sharing – applications that are signed by the same private key can be assigned with the same process ID on Android. In addition to signing, iOS application binaries are also partially-encrypted to mitigate unauthorized distribution. Each application downloaded from the iTunes Store has to be decrypted first in memory before launching. Starting from Android 4.1, all paid applications on Google Play are encrypted with a device-specific key before they are delivered and stored on an Android device.

Other features: iOS uses a sandboxing policy and Android uses UNIX UIDs to separate each individual application. Both platforms provide the service of encrypting users’ confidential data, which could also be remotely erased once the device is lost. In addition, both platforms have kill switches in the hands of Google/Apple which can be used to remove malicious applications from the users’

phones remotely. This feature limits the potential damage of a malicious application by preventing it from spreading widely. Finally, starting from Android 4.0 and iOS 4.3, both platforms provide address space layout randomization to help protect the systems and applications from exploitation due to memory vulnerabilities.

From the general comparison we can see that both platforms employ a number of common defense mechanisms, but also have their own distinct features. Android’s privilege notification has some security advantage, but it pushes the most important security checking work to its end users who might not have expertise in security and may not even read or understand those privileges listed during application installation [8]. On iOS, the approval process provides certain degree of defense against malicious applications. However, its capability is limited and can be bypassed sometimes [6]. Thus, a systematic comparison of the applications on these two platforms is needed to fully understand the effectiveness of these two different security architectures.

B. Comparison Framework Overview

To perform a fair comparison on security and privacy provided by Android and iOS, we focus on comparing the cross-platform applications on these two platforms. The overview of our comparison framework is given in Figure 1, and the rest of this paper is organized according to the flow of this comparison framework. Section III provides the statistics of the cross-platform third-party applications on both Android and iOS. Section IV then analyzes all types of SS-APIs on Android and compares them with those on iOS platform. The design and implementation of our static analysis tools are presented in Section V. With the SS-API mapping and static analysis tools on both Android and iOS, we then perform our static analysis on the 1,300 pairs of applications selected, and the results are presented and discussed in Section VI and Section VII. Finally, we summarize related work in Section VIII and conclude the paper in Section IX.

III. CROSS-PLATFORM APPLICATIONS

A. Preliminary Data Collection

In order to find out what are the applications that exist on both Android and iOS, we need to compare their detailed information such as application name, developing company, application description, etc. The application product pages from Google Play and iTunes App Store do provide such information, although public APIs of obtaining this information do not exist. Thus, we build web crawlers for both Google Play and iTunes Store, and collect detailed application information for 312,171 Android applications and 478,819 iOS applications from April to May in 2012, which are further analyzed to identify cross-platform applications.




Figure 1. Overview of the comparison framework.

B. Identifying Cross-platform Applications

We consider two applications (one on Android and the other on iOS) to be two versions of the same *cross-platform* application if they have the same set of functionality. For example, both Android and iOS has a Facebook application that provides the same functionality.

To be able to handle the large number of candidate cross-platform applications, we first develop an automatic tool to find the most likely candidates by comparing their names, developer information, and the application descriptions (refer to Appendix A for detailed discussion on the automatic process). These candidates are categorized into five non-overlapping sets according to the degree of similarity in the three attributes, and we randomly select some candidate applications from each set and manually analyze the functionality of them for verification.

An interesting output of this analysis is that it enables us to estimate the total number of cross-platform applications on Android and iOS. Using the true positive rates obtained from our manual verification, we find that 12.2% (about one in eight) applications on Android have a replica application on iOS.

C. Stratified Sampling

To minimize the propagation of errors from the identification of cross-platform application into subsequent analysis, we focus our static analysis of cross-platform application on the candidate set that contains application pairs that have exactly the same name and developer information as well as a high degree of similarity in the descriptions. This set provides a total number of 20,171 cross-platform applications. The distribution of these applications among different categories is given in Figure 2, which is compared

with the distribution of all applications on Android and iOS in the entire data set collected. As shown in Figure 2, cross-platform applications are more likely to appear in “Business” and “Games” categories, and are less likely to appear in “Books” or “Utilities”.




Figure 2. The distribution of the cross-platform apps vs. the distribution of all third-party apps on Android and iOS.

Among these 20,171 cross-platform applications, we select 1,300 pairs (2,600 applications) to perform detailed static analysis on the application executables. To improve the representativeness of this sample set, we perform a stratified sampling according to the category distribution of these cross-platform applications. We then pick the most *popular free* applications within each category. During the sampling, we also exclude applications that only work on tablets (e.g., iPad and Google Tablet) so that our analysis could focus on applications that are mainly developed for smartphones. Finally, we manually checked all the chosen pairs of applications to ensure that they are real cross-platform applications. The results of the static analysis on these selected applications will be presented in Section VI.

IV. COMPARING APPLICATION PRIVILEGES

To compare the security architecture of Android and iOS, one of the most important comparison perspectives is to find out the similarity and difference on restricting the privileges for the third-party applications running on these platforms. However, it is not clear how such privileges can be compared as they might be of different granularity on the two platforms, and a mapping of them between the two platforms is not present in the literature. To make things more complicated, although Google provides a comprehensive list of application permissions for Android [9], there is no official documentation specifying what privileges are allowed for third-party applications on iOS – this is one of the iOS mysteries to be revealed in our work.

We choose to focus our work on Android 4.0 and iOS 5.0 which were both officially released in October 2011. Given the 122 application permissions supported on Android 4.0 [9], we first find out what is the exact privilege obtained in each permission by examining the functionality of all APIs related to this permission according to the mapping of Android permission to API¹ provided by [5]. We then carefully investigate both online advisories and offline iOS documentations on Xcode² to find out whether each privilege available on Android is supported, and how it is supported on the iOS platform. The overview of the analysis result is given in Table II.

Table II
A CLASSIFICATION OF ANDROID APPLICATION PRIVILEGES

Group of Privileges	#*	SS-API types
Does not actually exist in Android Already deprecated in Android, or no Android API corresponds to it.	7	SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATIONS BRICK
Reserved by Android system Only for OEMs, not granted to third-party apps. i.e., these privileges can only be used by apps signed with system keys.	42	DELETE_CACHE_FILES WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS
Not supported on iOS Either iOS does not have such device e.g., removable storage; or iOS does not allow third-party apps to have such privilege.	51	CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS
Both supported by iOS and Android Third-party apps have these privileges on iOS as default.	20	BLUETOOTH READ_CONTACTS RECORD_AUDIO

* This column lists the number of SS-API types [9] in each privilege group.

Although the term “permission” used on Android platform is concise, it also implies that there is access control in the architecture, which iOS barely has³. Thus, in the rest of the paper, we use *SS-API type* to refer to a group of SS-APIs that require the same privilege to access certain private data or sensitive service. The name and scope for most of the SS-API types follow the official Android permission list [9] with three exceptions which will be explained in Section IV-C.

As shown in Table II, among all the Android SS-API types, three of them (PERSISTENT_ACTIVITY, RESTART_PACKAGES and SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATIONS) have deprecated, and four of them (such as BRICK) do not really exist in Android, as there are no API calls, content providers or intents in

¹The mapping provided by [5] focuses on Android 2.2. We extend the mapping by adding the 10 additional permissions supported on Android 4.0 with a similar method introduced in [5].

²Xcode is a suite of tools from Apple for developing software for Mac OS X and iOS. It provides iOS API documentations for registered developers. See <http://developer.apple.com/xcode/>.

³Security entitlements are introduced for iOS applications from iOS 5, which are semantically similar to permissions. However, according to the latest official document [10], the accessible entitlements for third-party iOS developers only control iCloud storage and push notification. Though fine-grained entitlements are available on OS X to control access of private data such as address book and pictures, a third-party iOS application does not need such entitlements to access these data.

Android related to these SS-API types [5]. The rest of the SS-API types are then divided into three groups according to our findings⁴.

A. Privileges reserved for Android system applications

The openness concept of Android and its online documentations may have given a misleading understanding to users and developers that a third-party Android application can obtain any privilege. However, this is not true – many SS-APIs are only provided for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), and are not granted to third-party applications. Examples of these API types include DELETE_CACHE_FILES, INSTALL_LOCATION_PROVIDER, FACTORY_TEST, etc.

Since there are no official documentations specifying which privileges are reserved for OEMs on Android, we identify this list of SS-API types by analyzing the protection level tags in the frameworks/base/core/res/AndroidManifest.xml file, as API types reserved for system applications are labeled as android:protectionLevel="signatureOrSystem" or android:protectionLevel="signature" in this firmware configuration file. In order to validate this list, a testing application is developed which tries to access all SS-APIs on Android, then those SS-API types that are denied to this application are recorded. Finally, 42 SS-API types are found to be reserved for system applications on Android, which are not granted to third-party applications unless users explicitly give them the root privilege.

B. Privileges not supported on iOS

Among the rest of SS-API types which can be used by Android third-party applications, we are interested in finding out how many of them are also supported by iOS. Surprisingly, our analysis result shows that more than 2/3 of these SS-API types are not supported on iOS. The reasons are either because iOS does not have corresponding functionality/device, or iOS just does not allow third-party applications to have such privileges. Examples of SS-API types which are not supported on iOS are given in Table III.

It is interesting to notice that iOS does not allow some SS-API types to applications due to non-security reasons. Although it is not officially documented, APIs for changing global settings that would affect the user experience (UX) are usually disallowed by Apple, and that is one of the reasons why there are still many people who jailbreak their iPhones. Examples of such SS-API types include MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS, SET_TIME_ZONE, SET_WALLPAPER, WRITE_SETTINGS, etc. Although this would limit the capability of third-party applications, it is still reasonable from the

⁴The four groups of privileges listed in Table III are exclusive with each other. There could be more refined categorization in each group. E.g., privileges that are reserved by Android system can be further divided according to whether these privileges are supported on iOS. However, we do not further divide each group in Table III, as the focus of this paper is the privileges that are allowed to third-party applications and supported on both Android and iOS, which is the last row in the table.

Table III
EXAMPLES OF UNSUPPORTED SS-API TYPES ON IOS

Reason (1) iOS does not have corresponding functionality/device:		
SS-API type	Description	iOS Explanation
MOUNT_FORMAT_FILESYSTEMS	Allows formatting file systems for removable storage.	There is no removable storage for iPhone, iPad, or iPod Touch.
NFC	Allows applications to perform I/O operations over NFC.	Current iOS devices including iPhone 5 still do not have NFC chip.
Reason (2) iOS does not allow it to third-party applications:		
SS-API type	Description	
KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES	Allows an application to kill background processes.	
PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS	Allows an application to monitor, modify, or abort outgoing calls.	
RECEIVE_SMS	Allows an application to monitor, record or process incoming SMS messages.	

UX perspective. For example, it could be a disaster if you are waiting for an important call, but a third-party application mutes the sound globally without your awareness.

C. Privileges supported by both Android and iOS

The last group of privileges in Table II contains the SS-API types supported on both Android and iOS. A comprehensive list of these SS-API types is given in Table IV. Note that although there are only 20 SS-API types both supported on Android and iOS, these SS-APIs cover the access rights to the most common resources/services, including user calendar, contacts, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi state, camera, vibrator, etc. As shown in Table IV, due to the API difference on Android and iOS, the name and scope of three SS-API types have been changed compared to corresponding Android permissions [9].

The first refined SS-API type is ACCESS_LOCATION. On Android, there are two permissions correspond to the privilege of accessing the location information, which are ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION and ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION. There are 20+ API calls related to these two permissions on Android, but all of them only require *either* of the two permissions. Similar as Android, iOS devices employ a number of different techniques for obtaining information about the current geographical location, including GPS, cell tower triangulation and most inaccurate Wi-Fi connections. However, which mechanism is actually used by iOS to detect the location information is transparent to the application and the system will automatically use the most accurate solution that is available. Thus, for an iOS application which invokes the location-related API calls (e.g., CLLocationManager.startUpdatingLocation), it actually requires both ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION and ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION privileges. Therefore, we create the ACCESS_LOCATION SS-API type as a common privilege between Android and iOS, in order to perform a fair comparison.

Table IV
SS-API TYPES SUPPORTED ON BOTH ANDROID AND IOS

SS-API Type	Abbr.	Description & Explanation
ACCESS_LOCATION	LOC	Allows to access the location info. This type corresponds to both ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION and ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION in [9].
ACCESS_NETWORK_INFO	ANI	Allows to access information about networks. This SS-API type corresponds to both ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE and ACCESS_WIFI_STATE in [9].
BATTERY_STATS	BAT	Allows to collect battery statistics.
BLUETOOTH	BLU	Allows to connect to bluetooth devices.
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN	BTA	To discover and pair bluetooth devices.
CALL_PHONE	PHO	Allows to initiate a phone call.
CAMERA	CAM	Allows to access the camera device.
CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE	CWS	Allows applications to enter Wi-Fi Multicast mode.
FLASHLIGHT	FLA	Allows access to the flashlight.
INTERNET	INT	Allows to open network sockets.
READ_CALENDAR	CAL	Allows to read the user's calendar data.
READ_CONTACTS	CON	Allows to read the user's contacts data.
READ_DEVICE_ID	RDI	Allows to read the device ID.
RECORD_AUDIO	RAU	Allows an application to record audio.
SEND_SMS	SMS	Allows to send SMS messages.
USE_SIP	SIP	Allows an application to use SIP service.
VIBRATE	VIB	Allows the access to the vibrator.
WAKE_LOCK	WAK	To disable auto-lock or screen-dimming.
WRITE_CALENDAR	CAL	Allows to write the user's calendar data.
WRITE_CONTACTS	CON	Allows to write the user's contacts data.

Similarly, Android provides APIs for checking the status (e.g., availability or connectivity) of different network types (e.g., WiFi or 3G). However, iOS APIs do not distinguish the different network types when checking the reachability of a given host or IP address. Thus, ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE and ACCESS_WIFI_STATE are combined into a single SS-API type – ACCESS_NETWORK_INFO to mitigate the bias when comparing the SS-API usage on these two platforms.

The last refined SS-API type is READ_DEVICE_ID. On Android, the scope of READ_PHONE_STATE permission corresponds to at least 18 Android API calls, which can be used to read the device ID, phone number, SIM serial number and some other information. However, on iOS, only device ID is allowed to be accessed by third-party applications due to security reasons. Thus, we create the READ_DEVICE_ID type which only includes the SS-APIs on both platforms that access the device ID. By obtaining the list of SS-API types both supported on Android and iOS, we are now able to analyze the usage differences of these SS-APIs in cross-platform applications.

V. STATIC ANALYSIS TOOLS

To compare the SS-API usage for third-party applications on Android and iOS, we build static analysis tools for both Android applications (Dalvik bytecode) and iOS applications (Objective-C executables). We explain the work flow of the

static analysis on both platforms in this section, and more technical details are given in Appendix B.

A. Android Static Analysis Tool

As introduced in Section II, each Android application provides a list of privileges that is shown to the user during installation, which is recorded in the AndroidManifest.xml in each application package file. However, this is not the exact list of SS-API types that this application actually accesses – many third-party applications are overprivileged by requesting a superset of privileges [5]. Thus, the ultimate goal of our Android static analysis tool is to output a minimum set of SS-API types that are accessed by the given application. The work flow of our Android tool is shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3. The work flow of our Android static analysis tool.

As shown in Figure 3, for each Android application, we first obtain the corresponding Dalvik executable (DEX), which is then disassembled into a set of .dex files using the Dedexer tool [11]. With the extended Android API call to permission mapping [5], our tool then performs multiple iterations on parsing and analyzing the disassembled files to produce a candidate list of SS-API types that this application accesses. However, this candidate list is not a minimum set due to the ambiguity in the Android API-to-permission mapping, which is caused by Android's permission validation mechanism. For example, android.app.ActivityManager.killBackgroundProcesses API call requires either RESTART_PACKAGES or KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES – i.e., either permission is sufficient for the application to invoke this API call. In order to further determine the exact privilege needed and output a minimum set of SS-API types, our tool then takes the intersection of the candidate list and the claimed list of SS-API types (parsed from AndroidManifest.xml). The output set of SS-API types is then used to compare with the set of SS-API types used by the replica application on iOS.

There are several technical challenges in analyzing the disassembled applications. On Android, SS-API calls may be invoked with different class names due to inheritance. By analyzing class information in the disassembled files, our tool rebuilds the class hierarchy so that it can recognize the API calls invoked from the applications’ own classes, which are inherited from API classes. API calls may also be invoked through Java reflection. Our tool performs backward slicing [12] to resolve the method name and class name actually invoked in each reflection instance – it traverses the code backwards, resolving all instructions that influence the method variable and class variable used in corresponding reflection. We also apply specific heuristics to resolve inter-procedural or inter-classes reflections. Although it is not possible to completely resolve all reflections statically [13], fortunately Android applications rarely use reflections according to our observations, as reported in Appendix B. Finally, SS-APIs may be accessed through content providers and intents on Android. Our tool adopts the same mechanisms as Stowaway [5] to recognize the invocation of content providers and intents in the applications.

B. iOS Static Analysis Tool

Compared to Android, static analysis on iOS platform is more challenging, as iOS is a closed-source architecture. Apple tries to control all software executed on iOS devices (iPhone, iPad and iPod Touch), which has several effects. First of all, the only way for a non-jailbroken iOS device to install third-party applications is through iTunes App Store. When an application is downloaded via iTunes Store, it will be encrypted and digitally signed by Apple. The decryption key for the application is added to the device’s secure key chain, so that each time this application is launched, it can be decrypted and then start to run on the iOS device.

It is not possible to directly perform static analysis on encrypted application binaries. Thus, before analyzing each application downloaded from iTunes Store, we need to obtain the decrypted application binary, which can only be achieved on a jailbroken iOS device. Jailbreaking gives us the capability to install the GNU Debugger, the Mach-O disassembler oTool and also the OpenSSH server on the device. These development tools enable us to crack any installed application on the device. After obtaining the decrypted iOS application binary, we utilize IDA Pro. [14] to disassemble the binary to obtain assembly instructions.

However, IDA itself is only able to mark a very small portion of Objective-C methods, especially when the symbols are stripped in the binary. The underlying reason is that iOS binaries are allowed to interchangeably use two instruction sets, ARM and THUMB, which have different instruction sizes and alignments. Without knowing the starting point of a method, IDA may treat a code fragment as a data entry by

mistake. Thus, our analysis tool extracts metadata⁵ from the application binary to guide IDA’s disassembling process.

After disassembling all methods in IDA, the next step is to resolve all the API calls in the assembly instructions, where the key step is to handle the objc_msgSend function. In an Objective-C executable, all accesses to a method or attribute of an Objective-C object at runtime utilize this objc_msgSend function, which is used to send messages to an instance of class in memory [15]. To statically determine the corresponding API call for each observed objc_msgSend, we adopt the backward slicing and forward constant propagation proposed by [16] in our iOS static analysis tool. The work flow of our iOS static analysis tool is illustrated in Figure 4.




Figure 4. The work flow of our iOS static analysis tool.

The last step of our static analysis tool is to output the set of SS-API types used in an iOS application. The access to most SS-API types can be directly recognized through corresponding API classes and methods, for example, user contacts are operated through ABPerson and ABAddressBook related APIs. However, some SS-API types like CALL_PHONE and SEND_SMS require further analysis of the parameter value. For example, given an API call `[[UIApplication sharedApplication] openURL:[NSURL URLWithString:[NSString stringWithFormat:@"tel:123-456-7890"]]]`, this will only launch the phone dialer when the string parameter starts with “tel:” prefix. The SS-API type SEND_SMS, however, has two forms of realizing the SMS functionality – the SMS sending view can be triggered by openURL with “sms:” prefix; an application can also call API such as `MFMessageComposeViewController.setMessageComposeDelegate` to send SMS messages. We carefully handle each of the cases for every resolved API call and corresponding parameter values in order to detect such SS-API invocations.

VI. COMPARISON ANALYSIS RESULTS

We applied our static analysis tools to the 1,300 pairs of selected cross-platform applications (downloaded in June 2012), the basic statistics of these applications are given in Table V. The direct outputs of our analysis tools are the

⁵These metadata extracted include the class names, the instance method list, the class method list, the instance variable list, the property list and the protocols that classes conform to. For each method, the method name, method signature string, and the start address of the method body are collected to guide IDA disassembling process.

lists of SS-API types accessed by these applications. By obtaining such lists, we are then able to compare the SS-API usage for each pair of cross-platform applications.

Table V
STATISTICS OF DOWNLOADED CROSS-PLATFORM APPLICATIONS

Parameters	Android apps	iOS apps
Number of apps	1,300	1,300
App size range (.apk & .ipa)	11KB~47MB	106KB~366MB
Total size of apps	7.42 GB	14.5 GB
App executable file size range (.dex & Objective-C binary)	3KB~6.2MB	25KB~39.5MB
Total size of executable files	1.10 GB	5.03 GB

A. Comparisons on both-supported SS-API types

Our first comparison focuses on the 20 SS-API types that are both supported on Android and iOS. We are interested in finding out how differently these SS-API types are used on the two platforms for cross-platform applications. Our results show that the total amount of SS-API types⁶ that are used by 1,300 Android applications is 4,582, which indicates that each Android application uses 3.5 SS-API types on average. In comparison, the corresponding 1,300 iOS applications access a total amount of 7,739 SS-API types, which has on average 5.9 types per iOS application. 948 (73%) of the applications on iOS access additional SS-API types compared to its Android version.

Among the 20 different SS-API types, some of them are accessed almost equally by the applications on both platforms. For example, INTERNET is required by 1,247 Android applications, and 1,253 iOS applications. However, some other SS-API types are used much more often by iOS applications compared to Android applications. The top 10 SS-API types that are accessed more often on iOS compared to Android are listed in Table VI.

To obtain a detailed understanding of the results provided in Table VI, we look into typical applications in each SS-API type. We find out that famous applications such as Twitter and XECurrency [17] do not access READ_DEVICE_ID APIs on Android. However, on their corresponding iOS version, we observe 5 locations in Twitter’s code and 6 locations in XECurrency’s code which read the device ID. Another typical instance is the famous free game “Words With Friends” [18] application. Compared to its Android version, the additional SS-API types accessed by its iOS version include (but are not limited to):

- BATTERY_STATS, as API call `UIDevice.setBatteryMonitoringEnabled` is observed;

⁶The set of SS-API types used by an application contains no duplicates, which indicates that the maximum number of SS-API types used by each application is 20. When calculating the total amount of SS-API types for 1300 applications, we simply sum the number of SS-API types used by each application.

- CALL_PHONE, as `UIApplication.openURL` with “tel:” parameter is observed in `IMAdView.placeCallTo` and two other locations;
- CAMERA, as `UIImagePickerController.setSourceType` with argument value `0x1` (which is `UIImagePickerControllerSourceTypeCamera`) is observed in `MobclixRichMediaWebAdView.takePhotoAndReturnToWebView`;
- FLASHLIGHT, as `AVCaptureDevice.setTorchMode` is observed in `MobclixRichMediaWebAdView.turnFlashlightOnWithSuccess`; etc.

More interestingly, we also check the most popular game application Angry Birds, although it does not belong to the 1,300 sampling set as it is not free on iOS. The result shows that compared to its Android version, Angry Birds on iOS additionally reads the user contacts data, as API call `ABAddressBookGetPersonWithRecordID` and `ABAddressBookCopyArrayOfAllPeople` are observed in the code section of `CCPrivateSession.getArrayOfAddressBookEmailAddressesNamesAndContactIDs` and four other locations⁷.

As shown in Table VI, our findings in the comparisons on the 20 SS-API types both supported on Android and iOS show that iOS third-party applications turn to access more often to some devices (such as camera and vibration) and are more likely to access sensitive data such as device ID, user contacts and calendar. Thus, our next step of analysis is to find out the underlying reason why such phenomenon exists. As one may notice from the examples given above, some of these APIs are actually invoked by the third-party libraries used in these applications (such as `IMAdView` and `MobclixRichMediaWebAdView` classes in the `WordsWithFriends` application). Thus, our next step is to analyze the SS-API usage of the third-party libraries on both platforms.

B. SS-API Usage of Third-party Libraries

In order to analyze the SS-API usage of third-party libraries, first of all, we need to identify all the third-party libraries within each application. As there are no clear boundaries that an included library or package in a given application is written by the application developer or belongs to a third-party library, we first process the whole application set to calculate the number of different package names (on Android) or class names (on iOS). Then the packages or classes that appear in more than 10 applications (and at least belong to two different companies) are automatically collected. We then manually check this list to identify the third-party libraries, which include advertisement libraries, analytic libraries or just third-party development libraries. Some of the packages or classes are combined because they belong to the same third-party library. Finally, we

⁷The API calls which access user contacts have been observed in all previous versions of Angry Birds including version 2.1.0, which was released in March 2012. However, from Angry Birds version 2.2.0 (released in August 2012), these API calls have been removed from this game, which is probably due to the privacy changes of the newly released iOS 6.

Table VI
SS-API TYPES WITH GREATEST DISPARITY THAT ARE ACCESSED BY THE APPLICATIONS ON ANDROID AND IOS.

SS-API type	Number of Android apps	Number of iOS apps	Only on iOS ¹	Only on Android	On both platforms	Lib / App Ratio ²	Exclusive Lib / App Ratio ³
READ_DEVICE_ID	510	925	469	54	456	60% / 64%	36% / 40%
CAMERA	172	601	435	6	166	38% / 73%	27% / 62%
VIBRATE	374	522	290	142	232	62% / 46%	54% / 38%
ACCESS_NETWORK_INFO	885	1065	269	89	796	15% / 96%	4% / 86%
READ_CONTACTS	151	388	256	19	132	52% / 75%	25% / 48%
SEND_SMS	29	264	248	13	16	49% / 68%	32% / 51%
WRITE_CONTACTS	86	297	219	8	78	51% / 80%	20% / 49%
ACCESS_LOCATION	553	728	217	42	511	48% / 67%	33% / 53%
RECORD_AUDIO	37	177	155	15	22	35% / 99%	1% / 65%
READ_CALENDAR	35	174	141	2	33	35% / 67%	33% / 65%

¹ The number of cross-platform apps which access the corresponding SS-API type only in its iOS version, but not in its Android version. The value of this column equals to the difference between “Number of iOS apps” and “On both platforms”.

² A break-down for the sources of SS-API types: Lib – from third-party libs; App – from the app’s own code. The base of the ratio is column “Only on iOS”.

³ The ratio of applications in column “Only on iOS”, where the corresponding SS-API type is exclusively caused by third-party libraries or apps’ own code.

identified 79 third-party libraries on Android and 72 third-party libraries on iOS that are commonly used. The 8 most commonly used advertising and analytic libraries on Android are listed in Table VII, and the 8 most common libraries on iOS are listed in Table VIII.

Table VII
MOST COMMON ADVERTISING/ANALYTIC LIBRARIES ON ANDROID

Library Name	App Ratio	SS-API types*
com/google/ads	21.7%	ANI, INT
com/flurry/android	19.1%	LOC, INT
com/google/android/apps/analytics	12.5%	ANI
com/tapjoy	7.9%	INT, RDI
com/millennialmedia/android	7.3%	ANI, INT, RDI
com/admob/android/ads	4.4%	LOC, INT
com/adwhirl	3.8%	LOC, INT
com/mobclix/android/sdk	3.2%	LOC, ANI, INT, RDI

* The abbreviations of these SS-API types are given in Table IV.

Table VIII
MOST COMMON ADVERTISING/ANALYTIC LIBRARIES ON IOS

Library Name	App Ratio	SS-API types*
Flurry	19.9%	LOC, INT, RDI
GoogleAds	15.9%	ANI, INT, RDI, SMS, VIB, WAK
Google Analytics	9.8%	INT
Millennial Media	9.3%	LOC, ANI, CAM, INT, CON, RDI, VIB
TapJoy	9.1%	ANI, INT, RDI
AdMob	7.2%	LOC, INT, CON, RDI
AdWhirl	6.9%	LOC, ANI, INT, RDI
Mobclix	3.7%	LOC, ANI, BAT, CAM, FLA, INT, CAL, CON, RDI, SMS, VIB

* The abbreviations of these SS-API types are given in Table IV.

By tracking the code regions of these libraries, our static analysis tools are able to determine the origin of the SS-API calls in each application. We can then identify the types of SS-APIs used in each third-party library on both platforms, which are shown in Table VII and Table VIII. The data from

these two tables clearly indicate that libraries on iOS turn to access more SS-API types compared to Android third-party libraries. Thus, the SS-API usage difference for those cross-platform applications is indeed partially caused by the difference of third-party libraries.

To quantify the influence of the third-party libraries on the SS-API usage difference between the two versions of cross-platform applications, for each SS-API type, we first identify those applications which access the corresponding SS-API type only on its iOS version, but not on Android version (which is the “Only on iOS” column in Table VI). For each of these applications, we then track the origins in the code which access the corresponding SS-APIs – either from the third-party libraries used in the application, or from the application’s own code. The results are shown in the last two columns in Table VI. The two ratios in the “Lib/App Ratio” column represent the percentage of the applications that: (a) the third-party libraries used in the application access the corresponding SS-API type; (b) the application’s own code access the corresponding SS-API type. As can be seen from the table, the sum of these two ratios is more than 100%. This is because in some applications, SS-APIs belong to the same type are used both in the application’s own code and in the third-party libraries. Thus, the last column in Table VI is given, which shows the percentage of applications, where the corresponding SS-API type is only used by the third-party libraries or application’s own code.

From the results shown in Table VI, we can see that the third-party libraries do have certain impacts on the difference of the SS-API usage for cross-platform applications. For example, 54% applications which use additional VIBRATE APIs on iOS is purely because of the third-party libraries used in these applications. And from Table VIII we can find the exact source – libraries such as GoogleAds, Millennial Media and Mobclix all use VIBRATE APIs. Thus, any application which includes these libraries will in turn use this

SS-API type. Similar links can be drawn from Table VI and Table VIII for other SS-API types such as READ_DEVICE_ID and READ_CONTACTS.

Comparing the data in Table VII and Table VIII, the results show that the most commonly used third-party libraries, especially advertisement and analytic libraries on iOS, access much more SS-APIs compared to the libraries on Android. A likely explanation of this phenomenon could be because *on iOS, the SS-APIs can be accessed more stealthily compared to on Android, where applications need to list out the types of SS-APIs they need to access during installation.* The privileges to use these SS-APIs on iOS are granted to third-party applications as default without users' awareness, which gives certain freedom for advertisement and analytic libraries to access user data and sensitive resources.

To confirm our findings on the third-party iOS libraries, we further check each library listed in Table VIII to see whether it is an open-source library. For the open-source libraries (e.g., AdWhirl [19]), we manually look into their source code and confirm all SS-API types that are accessed. For the closed-source library Flurry, we also find evidences that this library collects the device ID in its official documentation [20], which mentioned "Because Apple allows the collection of UDID for the purpose of advertising, we continue to collect this data as the Flurry SDK includes AppCircle, Flurry's mobile advertising solution."

From the data given in the last column in Table VI, one can observe that third-party libraries only contribute a portion of the difference of the SS-API usage for cross-platform applications; the other part of the difference is caused by the application's own code. By removing the SS-API types that are exclusively caused by third-party libraries, our static analysis tools manage to output the lists of SS-API types that are caused by the applications' own code on both platforms. The comparison result shows that 3,851 SS-API types are used by 1,300 Android applications in their own code, while iOS applications use 6,393 – there is still a significant difference for the SS-API usage on the two platforms. This difference leads us to investigate further into applications' code logic to find out the underlying reasons.

C. Microanalysis on Application Code Logic

In order to perform a manual analysis on the code logic of the cross-platform applications, it will be ideal to have full access to the application source code. However, applications which are open-source on both platforms are very rare, given the fact that iOS platform has very little open-source applications. Nevertheless, we manage to find 8 applications that are open-source on both platforms⁸. We retrieve the source code of these applications and analyze the underlying reasons of their SS-API usage differences. The detailed API

information collected from closed-source applications is also utilized to assist the analysis. According to our manual inspection, there are at least two factors that have strong correlations with the SS-API usage differences between iOS and Android applications.

1) *Coding difference*: The most natural reason which may be expected is the implementation difference between the two versions of cross-platform applications. For example, ACCESS_NETWORK_INFO APIs are only used by the iOS version of WordPress, but not by its Android version. In its iOS version, several API calls in WPReachability class are invoked, which are used to test the reachability to the WordPress hosts. However, for the Android version of WordPress, there is no code for testing any reachability. For example, when posting a blog to the server, the code of Android WordPress simply checks the return value of the posting function to see whether the connection is successful or failed. But on iOS, many Objective-C classes in the WordPress code will actively check the reachability beforehand, and notify the users if the network is not reachable. Such implementation difference leads to the SS-API usage difference that WordPress on iOS uses the additional ACCESS_NETWORK_INFO APIs compared to its Android version. Similar evidence can be found in the source code of MobileOrg application.

Such coding difference is also the main reason causing the difference in using the CAMERA SS-APIs. Taking the popular applications such as eBuddyMessenger and SmackIt, in their iOS versions, the user profile photo in the setting can either be chosen from the pictures stored on device, or by directly taking the photo with the device's camera. However, their Android versions do not provide such photo taking option. Note that such implementation difference does not only exist in the applications' own code, but also for the same third-party libraries on two platforms. For example, CAMERA SS-APIs are used by OpenFeint library on iOS, but not by its Android version, which is caused by the same reason mentioned above.

2) *Intentional avoidance*: On the other hand, we also find evidences that even the functionality of the two versions of cross-platform application are the same, some SS-APIs are intentionally avoided to be used on Android. We use open-source application WordPress to explain this phenomenon.

Compared to its Android version, WordPress on iOS uses the additional READ_DEVICE_ID APIs. In the WordPress iOS code, runStats method of WordPressAppDelegate reads the uuid, os_version, app_version, language, device_model, and then sends them to <http://api.wordpress.org/iphoneapp/update-check/1.0/> to check whether this application needs to be updated. On the Android platform, the code of WordPress performs the same functionality – in the wpAndroid class, uploadStats method tries to retrieve the same set of data and sends these data back to WordPress server to check for update. However, there is one major difference for the WordPress code on Android compared to the code on iOS. In its iOS code, the uuid is

⁸These 8 open-source applications are WordPress, Mixare, MobileOrg, andRoc/iRoc, Mp3tunes, ZXing(Barcodes), DiceShaker and MobileSynth.

retrieved by directly calling `UIDevice.uniqueIdentifier`, which returns the device unique ID. In contrast, for its Android version, the `uuid` used is a random ID which is unique, but not the real device ID. It is a unique ID that is randomly generated and stored as the first record in WordPress’s own SQLite database on the Android device. Thus, the different way of obtaining `uuid` is the reason that WordPress on iOS uses the additional `READ_DEVICE_ID` SS-API type.

The special way of obtaining the `uuid` in the Android version of WordPress makes us speculate that the programmers intentionally try to avoid using the `READ_DEVICE_ID` APIs on Android. This is further confirmed by consulting one of the WordPress developers, who gives the explanation as: “a random id is better than the device id because it doesn’t require that permission which reads quite poorly as ‘read phone state and identity’ ”. Thus, the reason that the developers do not try to avoid using the device ID on iOS is because of the same reason mentioned in Section VI-B – on Android, an application needs to show the list of SS-API types it needs to access to the user during installation; while on iOS, no such notification is given to the user. We suspect that this may also be the main reason which causes the difference in accessing SS-API types such as `READ_CONTACTS` and `READ_CALENDAR`. But unfortunately, due to the limited access to applications’ source code, we are not able to get the ground-truth evidence for these SS-API types, as what has been done for the `READ_DEVICE_ID`.

D. The Usage of SS-API Types Unsupported on iOS

Previous analyses focus on the 20 SS-API types that are both supported on Android and iOS, without taking into account of the additional 51 SS-API types that are only supported on Android platform. Thus, the last step of our analysis is to find out how frequently these SS-APIs are used by those Android applications, and what are usage characteristics of these SS-APIs.

Taking into account of the 51 SS-API types, our results show that the 1,300 Android applications use 1,230 SS-API types in total which are unsupported on iOS. As shown in Table IX, the most frequently accessed SS-API type that is unsupported on iOS is `WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE`, which is used by more than half of the Android applications. This can be explained from the nature of Android devices. Different from iOS devices which have 8GBytes to 64GBytes of internal storage, Android devices usually have less internal storage. Thus, all Android devices support external storage such as microSD card. As a result, Android applications which want to store their application data usually need to utilize `WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE` APIs to write to the microSD card, in order to save the internal storage space.

Except `WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE`, the remaining 50 SS-API types that are not supported on iOS are used infrequently (only 468 in total, which is 0.36 per application on average). Such a result shows that the 20 SS-API types both

Table IX
THE USAGE OF SS-API TYPES UNSUPPORTED ON iOS (TOP 8)

SS-API types unsupported on iOS	# of Android Apps
<code>WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE</code>	762
<code>GET_ACCOUNTS</code>	133
<code>RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED</code>	55
<code>GET_TASKS</code>	45
<code>CHANGE_WIFI_STATE</code>	44
<code>READ_LOGS</code>	15
<code>RECEIVE_SMS</code>	13
<code>READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS</code>	11

supported on iOS and Android are the most commonly used SS-APIs for third-party applications. Note that although the SS-API types only supported on Android are not commonly used in popular Android applications, they may bring serious security breaches when utilized by malicious applications. For example, the `READ_LOGS` privilege, which allows a third-party application to “read the low-level system log files” can be utilized to read many other sensitive data such as SMS, contacts and location information as demonstrated in [21].

On the other hand, iOS also has its own specific SS-APIs that do not exist on Android. For example, two services, iCloud storage and push notification, which are controlled by entitlements are specific to the iOS platform. However, since the focus of this paper is on the SS-API types supported on both platforms, investigating the SS-APIs that are only supported on iOS is left as future work.

VII. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS

We remark that our comparison analysis framework is still in its preliminary stage. One limitation of the current framework is the completeness of iOS SS-APIs. Although we tried our best to search for all the related API calls on iOS that lead to a corresponding SS-API type, it is very difficult to test the thoroughness of the obtained SS-API set. We may still miss some API calls that belong to certain SS-API types. However, this limitation only indicates that the list of SS-API types for a given iOS application produced by our static analysis tool is a lower bound on the actual list of SS-API types this application uses. Even the number of SS-API types used by iOS applications might be underestimated, it is still much larger than the number of SS-API types used by Android applications. Thus, this limitation will not affect the conclusion drawn from our analysis.

Another limitation that has not been addressed during the analysis is the dead code issue – though some SS-APIs exist in the application binaries, they may not be executed during run-time. Detecting unreachable code statically involves performing complex control flow analysis to locate the code regions that will never be executed, which has not been adopted in our static analysis tools. However, even some SS-API calls in the binaries will not be executed, they may still bring potential security risks (e.g., they can be utilized

by return-to-libc or return-oriented programming [22], [23] to launch attacks).

An important assumption is used in our analysis when comparing iOS version and Android version of the cross-platform applications. We assume these two versions should ask for similar privileges and should have similar functionality. There could be cases that the developers first implemented a full-functioned version on one platform and are just in the process of integrating new functionality into the version on the other platform. However, we believe that this assumption holds when it is considered in a large scale context. But as the whole analysis process is not fully automated (the application downloading and cracking is a half-manual process), and also due to the relatively slow speed for iOS application analysis (which takes several minutes to several hours for each application depending on the complexity of the binary), we limit our current analysis to those 2,600 applications instead of the entire set of cross-platform applications. In addition, as a complement to the comparisons conducted on free applications, we also perform the analysis on 200 popular paid applications. The results are given in Appendix C, which are consistent with our main findings on free applications. Note that our sampling towards popular applications (both free and paid) may introduce bias if the results are used as an estimation on the whole third-party applications. However, due to limited resources, this work focuses on popular applications, which have more impact on the privacy of end-users.

In order to examine the accuracy of our findings, ground truth needs to be obtained for every application tested, which is an impossible task without the application's source code. However, we tried our best to discover the underlying ground truth by investigating the visible differences on closed-source applications and libraries; by obtaining and examining the source code of available open-source applications; and by consulting some application developers on our findings. Although it is not possible to verify the result of every cross-platform application, we believe that the statistical difference in our findings has revealed the tendency of iOS third-party applications which turn to access more SS-APIs compared to applications on Android.

The immediate implication of such findings is that users on iOS may have higher risks of privacy leakage in comparison to Android. However, the occurrence of the actual privacy leakage for a particular user depends on many factors, including which applications this user installs, and whether the applications or libraries send the private data out at runtime. Thus, our findings do not necessarily imply that Android has a better privacy protection compared to iOS, given the fact that iOS restricts certain privileges to third-party applications (as shown in Section IV) and also previous research works [24], [25] have shown that third-party applications on Android could gain additional privileges by launching privilege-escalation attacks. However, our findings

have shown a strong correlation between the SS-API usage difference and the lack of an explicit privilege-list mechanism on iOS, which implies that Apple's vetting process may not be as effective as Android's privilege notification mechanism, particularly in the aspect of restricting SS-API usage by application developers.

VIII. RELATED WORK

Previous studies focus on either Android or iOS platform alone. Enck et al. [26] examine Android security policies and some of the developer pitfalls. They further investigate the source code of a thousand Android applications [27], which reveals a number of interesting findings for Android application security, some of which are also confirmed by our results on Android. A large-scale evaluation for Android applications is performed by Zhou et al. [28], which reveals hundreds of malicious Android applications. Yan and Yin [29] provide analysis tools to reconstruct the OS and Dalvik semantics for malware analysis.

From the attacker's perspective, Felt et al. [24] demonstrate that a less privileged Android application is able to perform a privileged task through another third-party application with higher privilege. A similar privilege escalation attack which is implemented with return-oriented programming is introduced by Davi et al. [23]. The defense mechanism for such privilege escalation attack is proposed by Bugiel et al. [25].

There are also a number of research works focusing on analyzing and improving the Android permission model. Barrera et al. [30] present a methodology for the empirical analysis of permission-based security models, and apply it to Android permission model. In addition, Ongtang et al. [31] present a fine-grained access control policy infrastructure for protecting applications on Android. Hornyack et al. [32] also present two privacy controls to protect user data from exfiltration by permission-hungry applications. Grace et al. [33] systematically analyze several Android smartphone images and found they do not properly enforce the Android permission model. Xu et al. [34] propose a user-level sandbox to enforce flexible permission control without modifying the Android OS. Shekhar et al. [35] and Pearce et al. [36] provide specific techniques to separate permission usage of advertising libraries and hosting applications.

Felt et al. [5] study Android applications to determine whether Android developers follow least privilege with their permission requests. They developed a static analysis tool Stowaway that detects overprivilege in Android applications. They also create an Android API-to-permission mapping using dynamic testing, and this mapping is used as one of the inputs in our Android static analysis tool. This mapping could also be used in the permission check tool introduced by Vidas et al. [37], which aids developers in specifying a minimum set of permissions required for a given Android application with source code.

TaintDroid developed by Enck et al. [38] provides a system-wide dynamic taint tracking for Android, which can be used to monitor the realtime behavior of third-party Android applications. On the other hand, static analysis tools such as ScanDroid [39] and ComDroid [40] are also developed to identify Android application vulnerabilities, with additional consideration on action-based vulnerabilities.

In comparison to the literature on Android, there are relatively less studies on iOS platform. Seriot [41] demonstrated that any applications downloaded from iTunes Store can access a significant quantity of personal data. Egele et al. [16] study the privacy threats that third-party iOS applications pose to users. They present a static analysis tool that analyzes programs for possible sensitive information leakage. Our iOS static analysis tool adopts a similar mechanism in resolving `_objc_msgSend` as their tool, but with a different emphasis on resolving the API calls and parameters that are related to SS-APIs.

To our best knowledge, there is no literature to date that systematically compares the application security of Android and iOS platforms. This paper is the first work that establishes the baseline of examining the massive cross-platform applications to compare the effect of security mechanism utilized by Android and iOS, which reveals interesting behavioral differences for the third-party applications on these two platforms. We notice that a recent work by Pearce et al. [36] also identifies the overprivileging problem caused by advertising libraries on Android platform. Our work further discovers this problem on iOS platform and finds that an iOS application tends to use more SS-APIs compared to its Android counterpart even after excluding SS-API invocations by advertising libraries, which has not been investigated in existing works.

IX. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we made the first attempt towards systematically comparing mobile application security on diverse mobile platforms. In particular, the two most popular mobile platforms, Android and iOS, are chosen to investigate how the platform difference influences third-party applications in terms of privacy protection. As a prerequisite, we investigated the security-sensitive API (SS-API) types supported on iOS and their relations to Android application privileges, which were previously unclear. We then built our static analysis tools to perform massive static analysis for cross-platform applications on their SS-API usage.

Our analysis showed that applications on iOS tend to use more SS-APIs compared to their counterparts on Android, and are more likely to access sensitive resources that may cause privacy breaches or security risks without being noticed. Further investigation revealed a strong correlation between such difference and the lack of application privilege-list on the current iOS platform. Such results may imply that Apple's vetting process is not as effective as Android's

explicit privilege list mechanism in restricting the privilege usage by third-party application developers.

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APPENDIX A.

CROSS-PLATFORM APPLICATIONS IN CANDIDATE SETS

As shown in Table X, the conditions of selecting applications in each candidate set depend on the similarity of three attributes: application name, developing company and application description. We use Vector Space Model [42], one of the classical models in information retrieval, to compare the descriptions. The similarity between two application descriptions is calculated using:

$$\text{sim}(d_1, d_2) = \frac{\vec{d}_1 \cdot \vec{d}_2}{|\vec{d}_1| \times |\vec{d}_2|} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^t w_{i,1} \times w_{i,2}}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^t w_{i,1}^2} \times \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^t w_{i,2}^2}}$$

where \vec{d}_1 and \vec{d}_2 denote the descriptions of two applications (one on Android, and the other on iOS), after removing stop words, pure numbers and HTML tags (such as $\langle b \rangle$, $\langle p \rangle$) from the descriptions. $w_{i,j}$ is the weighting for the i^{th} term in description d_j which is assigned with the frequency of the term. The threshold for the high/low similarity score is set to 0.45 by manual tuning to obtain a good trade-off between the number of false positives and false negatives.

The similarity of the application names (as used in the rule of candidate set CS_4) is measured with Levenshtein Distance [43], as names are usually short string which contains only a few characters. One example for the cross-platform applications with similar names is ActDroid on Android and ActPhone on iOS – their name distance is 4 and their description similarity is 0.56.

We apply the corresponding rules to the entire application data set collected, and the number of application pairs in each candidate set is shown in Table X. The percentage shown in the table is calculated based on the total number of Android applications collected, which is 312,171. After obtaining those candidate sets, we then randomly choose 60 application pairs in each set to perform a manual validation –

Table X
CANDIDATE SETS FOR CROSS-PLATFORM APPLICATIONS: CONDITIONS AND STATISTICAL RESULTS

App Candidate Set	Conditions*	Unique App Pairs	Percentage	True Positive Rate
CS ₁	same appName, same Company, high similarity Description	20,171	6.46%	≈ 100%
CS ₂	same appName, same Company, low similarity Description	2,230	0.71%	> 98.3%
CS ₃	same appName, diff Company, high similarity Description	8,870	2.84%	83.3%
CS ₄	similar appName, same Company, high similarity Description	10,837	3.47%	68.3%
CS ₅	same appName, diff Company, low similarity Description	14,046	4.50%	6.67%

* The high/low similarity threshold for Description is set to 0.45, and the edit distance threshold for similar appName is set to ≤ 5.

we manually read the descriptions of these two applications, examine their companies, icons and screenshots to judge whether they are actually cross-platform applications. During our manual verification, no false positives are found in the CS₁ set, but one false positive is found in the CS₂ set which is caused by parsing error of non-unicode characters.

The results presented in Table X enable us to estimate the total amount of cross-platform applications exist on both Android and iOS. Applying formula $\sum_i \text{Percent}_{CS_i} \times \text{TPR}_{CS_i}$, where $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, 5\}$, and TPR_{CS_i} is the true positive rate of the corresponding candidate set, we get the result 12.2%. This indicates that, among those existing third-party applications on Android, approximately 1/8 of them have a replica application provided for iOS.

APPENDIX B.

API RESOLVING RATE OF ANALYSIS TOOLS

On the Android platform, Java reflection is found to be commonly used [5], which is also confirmed by our observation. Among the 1,300 Android applications being tested, we found that 951 (73%) use Java reflections to make API calls. However, the absolute number of reflections invoked is only 9,943, which means each application only make 7.6 reflection calls on average. This is a small amount (0.07%) compared to 10,778 API calls made by each application on average. Among all the reflections observed, our Android static analysis tool is able to resolve 7,859 (79%) reflections. This indicates that out of thousands of API calls issued per application, only 1.6 API calls are not resolved on average. Our tool failed to resolve the reflection call if the method name or class name is not generated statically. For example, some reflections invoke `java.lang.Class.getDeclaredMethods` with no parameters which simply return an array of methods, and then according to some dynamic rules, the code will pick one of the methods to invoke. Cases like this are very difficult to be resolved in a static manner [13], which is one of the limitations in our current implementation.

When applying our static analysis tool to the 1,300 iOS applications, we find that on average, 16.63% of the instructions in each application belong to C/C++ code and 83.12% instructions belong to Objective-C code; while the rest 0.25% are dummy instructions or the instructions that

our tool is unable to interpret. Our tool is able to capture all the invocations for the API calls that are invoked through C/C++ functions; while for the API calls in the disassembled Objective-C code, our tool is able to resolve 89.7% of the `_objc_msgSend` encountered. There are at least two cases where a given `_objc_msgSend` cannot be resolved. 1) The corresponding class instance is passed from the runtime as an argument of a callback function. 2) The class instance is retrieved from a collection object such as an array that can hold any types of objects. Such a limitation also exists in other static analysis tools on iOS platform [16]. Although not all `objc_msgSend` methods are able to be resolved, it only has quite limited influence in our experiments. The reason is that a number of API invocations for the same SS-API type are usually observed in an application, so that missing a small portion of API calls will not make our tool overlook the corresponding SS-API type in most cases.

APPENDIX C.

ANALYSIS RESULTS OF PAID APPLICATIONS

We performed the analysis on the most popular 100 pairs of paid cross-platform applications. For the 20 different SS-API types that are both supported on iOS and Android, the results show that the 100 paid applications on Android use a total amount of 297 SS-API types; while the corresponding 100 paid applications on iOS use 508 SS-API types. 79 of the iOS applications use additional SS-API types compared to its Android version. These results are consistent with our main findings on popular free applications. Although paid applications contain less advertising libraries, our results show that the applications' own code contributes more to the difference in the SS-API usage, as shown in Table XI.

Table XI
TOP 5 SS-API TYPES THAT ARE ACCESSED DIFFERENTLY BY PAID APPLICATIONS.

SS-API type	Android apps	iOS apps	Only iOS	Exclusive Lib/App Ratio
CAMERA	9	51	41	14% / 64%
READ_DEVICE_ID	41	79	40	12% / 53%
WAKE_LOCK	38	68	38	0% / 100%
ACCESS_LOCATION	12	35	32	63% / 32%
ACCESS_NETWORK_INFO	56	79	26	2% / 97%